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WHAT HAPPENED IN THE STOCKHOLM ARCHIPELAGO (FOERENINGEN 1//  
SVERIGES SJOFART...(U) NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT  
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
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## What Happened In The Stockholm Archipelago?

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\* /4

### A LARGE OPERATION!

It can be assumed for definite reasons that the submarine operations of the Warsaw Pact in the Stockholm archipelago were a large coordinated operation, which included six submarines, of which three were minisubmarines of a to date unknown type.

The submarines probably operated so that a conventional submarine was used as a mother ship for a minisubmarine.

The submarines and minisubmarines involved in the operation operated primarily in the central Stockholm archipelago. After release from the mother submarine the minisubmarine penetrated into the inner area of the archipelago. There were indications which suggest that these minisubmarines penetrated into Stockholm harbor in the last week in September.

The mother submarine returned to the vicinity of Sandhamn to rendezvous with the minisubmarine. It was detected and attacked with depth charges on 4. October by a Swedish patrol boat, and then contact was lost.

After rendezvous this submarine and the minisubmarine apparently left the area at the end of the first week in October.

The two other submarines with their minisubmarines had their primary missions in the southern region of the archipelago. At the turn of the month September-October both minisubmarines went into Hårsfjärden. Probably both the entrance from the south via Skramsösund and the entrance from the north at Huvudholmen were used.

On Friday on 1. October at 1250 hours two military recruits discovered at Berganäs the periscope of a submarine going into Hårsfjärden. On the basis of the periscope observation it was determined that this time it was a conventional submarine. At this time definitely one minisubmarine and with a high degree of probability two minisubmarines were already in the vicinity of Hårsfjärd.

The submarine which was detected at 1250 hours on 1. October could have left the area rather soon after its detection. A helicopter search was initiated immediately, which certainly was observed by the submarine. The submarine would have had a good possibility to leave the Hårsfjärd area already at an early stage in the search. The thereafter following observations and sightings which were made in Hårsfjärd are regarded as having derived from the two minisubmarines which were operating there.

A minisubmarine passed Huvudholmen both when it entered and left Hårsfjärd. This minisubmarine in both cases left impressions of its keel and probably left the area a few days after 1. October.

Both this submarine and its mother submarine probably remained in the vicinity of the archipelago during the following week. On the evening of 7. October it was determined that a conventional submarine was in position immediately south of Oxnödde, immediately outside the northern entrance to Hårsfjärden. It is probable that this submarine left the archipelago during the following days.

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
\* Numbers in the right margin indicate pagination in the original text.

The entrance at Mälsten was probably not used, because it was probably known aboard the submarines that there were minefields in this area. /4

The minisubmarine which left behind the track marks was in Djupviken inside Hårsfjärd on the morning of 6. October. This would probably be the mini-submarine which generated the large number of indications inside Hårsfjärd in the following days. It cannot be precluded that this submarine could have suffered some minor damage from a depth charge. This submarine probably remained inside Hårsfjärd for a rather long time.

On 12. October it was determined that a conventional submarine was waiting in the waters outside Mälsten. This could have been the mother submarine which was waiting for the minisubmarine which had just left Hårsfjärden.

After this date all submarines probably left the inner archipelago area and had departed for home.



Drawing of the track marks which were found. This is possibly a technical development of a underwater vehicle with a track propulsion system.

On 2. October in the evening a sighting was made of what probably a submarine in the vicinity of the harbor in Oxelösund. It is therefore not improbable that the geographical extent of the operation was greater than is represented here in the course of events with the six submarines and minisubmarines reported in the southern and central Stockholm archipelago. It can also not be precluded that such a large operation did not include other associated collateral operations. /5

## THE NATIONALITY OF THE SUBMARINES

No concrete evidence in the form of a physical object was found which could link the foreign submarines to any particular country. None of the visual sightings could be documented with photographs. However, there is long series of indications. /5

During the period June to November 1982 there were however visual observations, which after analysis could provide the basis for identification of the country or of the class of submarine. 11 of these sightings occurred from the period prior to the Hårsfjärd incident. The sightings were made both by military and civilian personnel. These individuals were interrogated and were asked to make drawings of what they had seen.

All of the sightings were analyzed as being submarines from the Warsaw Pact. In two cases the class was identified as being the WHISKEY Class and one case where the identification was either WHISKEY, FOXTROT or JULIET Class\*. In the other instances the classes could not

\* NATO designation. The corresponding Russian designation is not known.

be determined, but inter al. the appearance of the sail indicated that it was a submarine from the Warsaw Pact.

Two acoustic detections of such a type were made which could be used to identify the nationality of the submarine. The two detections indicate submarines from the Warsaw Pact. The basis for this inter al. is that the propeller RPM could be determined.

It is possible with signal analysis to determine from what type of radar a signal is emitted. Knowledge of what ship has a particular radar station makes it possible then to determine what the class of the ship is and to what country it belongs. It is also possible not only to determine what class the submarine is, but to identify a particular submarine in a class.

Valuable information can also be obtained by monitoring radio traffic between ships and between ships and their bases. The results of the signal analysis indicate that the submarines appear to be from the Warsaw Pact.


The traces which were found on the sea bottom were photographed during the comprehensive investigation which was performed. These traces could come both from conventional submarines or minisubmarines. Some traces can be attributed only to Warsaw Pact submarines.

No sighting was made which indicates that any submarine violating Swedish territorial waters belonged to NATO.


If the sum of all of the evidence is added up unambiguously, then it is very clear that the violations of territorial waters at Hårsfjärd like the other violations during 1980-1982 were committed by submarines belonging to the Warsaw Pact. The fact that the Soviet Union has approximately 45 submarines (of which the majority are of the WHISKEY Class) of conventional type in service in the Baltic, while Poland has only four submarines of an older type and as far as it is known the GDR has no submarines is one of several factors which suggests that the Warsaw Pact is essentially identical with the Soviet Union. /7

## MINISUBMARINES

Minisubmarines have been known and have been in existence for a very long time. During WWII a large number of types was developed, from manned torpedoes to relatively large vehicles. Minisubmarines were used in a number of instances with varying results. (v. Article in Sveriges



Drawing of drag track found with marks of propeller tracks in the bottom mud. The impression is that of a submarine with reinforced keel and two propellers.



Tracks observed on the sea bottom indicate a meeting between a mini-submarine and a conventional submarine.

The current military utilization of minisubmarines is little known. It is however known that some Soviet units are equipped with minisubmarines. The INDIA Class with two rescue minisubmarines (submersibles) currently has two units. The minisubmarines are some 11 meters long. The rescue submarines can probably be released from the mother submarine and then be docked with it while they are submerged. Many military applications can be imagined other than the rescue of the crews of sunken submarines, for example, clandestine landing of special forces, picking up information, clandestine positioning of equipment or mine hunting. /7

The race which is happening in regard to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources at the bottom of the sea has been a strong impetus for the development of underwater technology. This can also be associated with the fact that surface ships have become progressively more vulnerable to missiles, a fact which makes the submarine all the more interesting. Submarines and ASW have had an increasing influence upon the strategic and operational planning of the great powers.

Coincidentally it is known that progressively more importance is being assigned to sudden surprise attacks on important military installations. One technique to realize such a surprise attack would be to land special forces (commandos) with submarines and/or minisubmarines. Such landings would require prior reconnaissance before they are carried out. It should be noted that Sweden is not the only country which has had foreign submarines violate its territorial waters.

The Baltic in recent years has assumed increased importance as a base area for Warsaw Pact naval forces. Shipyards, repair facilities and training facilities have been built and developed. The harbor capacity in the Baltic is increasing. Exercises in regard to amphibious operations and other naval exercises are also increasing. The Soviet build-up of bases on the Kola Peninsula and the intersection point between the interests of NATO and the Warsaw Pact which have developed in the North Atlantic have certainly caused the strategic importance of the Baltic and of Scandinavia to increase.

It is not possible to discern any particular motive for the continuing violations of territorial waters. Certainly many factors would play a role.

Intelligence gather and acquisition would be one reason for the submarine intrusions. But it is not reasonable to assume that is the entire motive or even a major part of the motive. The primary impression is that the submarine intrusions are preparatory actions in a military operations plan. It can therefore also be imagined that even in peace time exercises are conducted and testing of technology which are associated with such operational planning. It is also not reasonable to assume that the submarine operations directed against Sweden do not occur without the knowledge of the responsible political leadership. This fact gives the submarine intrusions a political dimension which is important for the (Swedish) security policy.

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